A propos Nicolas Sarkozy and the problem of the borders (2)

Historical Europe

However, we know that the basic shoot of modern political Europe was already formed a century earlier, in the formula of a “concert” of the European powers. Here we’re in the fields of the military, diplomacy, trade policy, and territorial order, each with some practical link to geography. As we are currently dealing with a union of states, these sectors are of utmost importance. Several features of that concert should be remembered.
1. All the capitals of the powers supposed to play in that concert where situated in what Louis later considered to be geographical Europe, though their territories might be extended far beyond that space. No major power in that sense was excluded, nor was any included which lacked this feature.
2. In particular, both the Russian and Ottoman empires were included in the “Europe of powers”.
3. Later constellations from WW1 to the “Conferences for Security and Cooperation in Europe” did not see changes in principle, except the inclusion of two states of North America in the group of powers dealing with the balances of Europe (but not in the basically geographical term “Europe”). And what they commendably counterbalanced was the Soviet Block which itself surpassed any geographical borders of Europe by far. In one way or another both the Ottoman Empire, and the Republic of Turkey as a successor state inheriting the former imperial capital and the eastern parts of the imperial heartlands, took part in all those proceedings.
4. With rather negligible exceptions, the territories of current EU-member states fall fully into the range of geographical Europe, and the same is true for current Turkey and Ukraine; however, the Russian Federation still extends far beyond.

In the light of the aforementioned matters we might conclude that just like De Gaulle, Hallstein etc. several older generations of statesmen did not intend or suppose that certain cultural differences should override the dealing with issues in the fields of security, foreign policy, economy, and territory. Moreover and instead, most of the time the powers were rivaling about influence, sending technical and military instructors to “Turkey” (in a broad meaning); encouraging investments; inviting and hosting delegations of political, economic, military and even religious men of influence; accepting students and exilants; and promoting their cultural achievements in the large cities. Obviously, they did not consider that there were a cultural distance too wide to bridge in the light of the “hard” (substantial) interests.

At about the same time when Herbert Louis wrote down his experiences with the geography of Europe in general and Turkey in particular, Dorothy Vaughan of Great Britain wrote down the results of her studies about the older history of “Europe and the Turk. A pattern of alliances 1350-1700” (Liverpool 1954). She revealed that while in those times there were always connotations of a fundamental religious war between (Christian) Europe and “Turkey”, realities on the ground worked quite differently. We may find these enlightening revelations reinforced and, in the affirmative, surpassed by many modern scholars. It should not and did not prevent them from investigating the differences (which may be quite enlightening in both directions as well); but it shows that the modern political generations, say from Bismarck to De Gaulle or to Ollie Rehn, did not outrightly contradict European practice of the earlier centuries of Turkish rule in Anatolia, the Balkans and the Black Sea-Caucasus region. Those mentioned here just dropped the aspect of crusader mentalities. As to the book itself, we are of course once more in the time when the idea of a politically united Europe took shape out of concerns that the history of clashes had to stop forever and Turkey already had joined the Council of Europe, for instance, as one of the seedlings planted to that end.

As wide as the culture gap may have been, it did not prevent all of Europe to adopt a wide variety of garden practice (of which the tulip is just a prominent example), the coffee house, textiles and sweets from down there, while military bands copying those of the Janissaries spread from Poland over Europe and the “free” noble courts of Hungary were eager to employ captive Turkish court musicians. Hopefully, the prospects of Turkish musicians today are more peaceful and profitable.

Both in condemnation and praise of the Ottoman Leviathan and his multi-religious society, their practice shaped European political thinking, as did their military power which indirectly enabled German (and Scandinavian as well as Hungarian, Czech and Dutch) Protestantism to resist Habsburg’s power and to survive as a shaping force of European development. Some “deeper” corners in Austria’s or Sweden’s deep counsciousness may still harbor the hopes and fears of some Habsburg or some Wasa royals of the time to this day, and what the presence of “the Turk” in the power balance at that time meant to them. But in similar respects we have to deal today with the questions of global integration, interreligious relations, and also the questions of defense and security in Europe.

Cappadocia

Now, as political, cultural and economic history do not give convincing assistance for the exclusion of Turkey from Europe, as the historical competition for superior religious tolerance, all in all, still sees Muslim in advantage over Christian practices, and as we have understood that the use of religion as a determinant of Europe would work as a time bomb anyway, the question of “Cappadocia” may emerge. The name of Kappadokia sounds Greek, though some historiographical maps have it as a Persian provincial name approximately covering what today is known as Georgia, Trabzon and Armenia. Mine however is a vague suspicion that Sarkozy did not have especally this connotation in mind.

Rather, he may refer to the Roman province of Cappadocia, which was right to the east of the province of Galatia. Galatia in turn means the same as Gallia, “the country of the Gauls”, or Celts. As I’m living in a country right to the east of Gallia, I get attentive: Is there a hidden meaning?

But no, Sarkozy wouldn’t struggle with Angela Merkel. He may appear a bit rough, but certainly he will remain a chevalier. Moreover, at times “Cappadocia” would have been not east but south of Galatia and both immediately east of “Asia”, as far as it concerns Roman provincial names.

But then, what’s the issue with Cappadocia? Or with “Asia Minor”? Is it too important for the history of Christianity? Or too important for ancient Greek and Roman culture? It was there when Gajus Julius Caesar wrote his famous “veni, vidi, vici”, some years after his conquest of Gallia. Did he come through what he considered the place of origin of the Julian family, that is Troy, at that time situated in the province of “Asia”? Though, it was Augustus who celebrated this origin the most. We could remove layer after layer of Roman and Hellenic culture, perhaps wandering with St. Paul, then resting some time at the Mäander with Heraclitos (“one does not enter the same river twice” - an interesting metaphor for those living at the Rhine or Seine rivers or elsewhere) - in the end, will Sarkozy try to enter the same “Cappadocia” twice, as did St. Paul? If so, I would recommend some skiing vacancies as it would effortlessly support understanding of a geographical difference between Cappadocia and “the Mediterranean”, Morocco for instance. And if he would chose the version of Cappadocia which includes the old Caesarea, Greek Kaisareia, now Kayseri, he might at après-ski band with some of those exotic “Islamic Calvinists” to discuss economic competitiveness - though, with a table water rather than wine. But some wine, Turkish or French, would certainly be available if necessary.

We might go further to look for the first Hittite ironsmith in one of the historical Cappadocias, or right back to the invention of agriculture, at which point we would surprisingly meet again with the geographical definition of Europe and its ecological preconditions. Is there a land which is more naturally European?

Conclusions

There is hardly reason to get nervous if the question of European borders will be rised in an EU working group. At least, it will not negatively affect the prospects of Turkey’s accession, nor those of the GUAM states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldavia), nor those of Armenia, Belarus, the Western Balkans, or an acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem. In fact, it will reaffirm these prospects, and some politicians may resent the idea exactly for this reason. Anyway, a further expansion of the EU beyond this good dozen of countries is virtually impossible in the foreseeable future. Russia is more questionable in that respect, but some sort of solution should be found. At least on geographical grounds total exclusion is impossible.

However, there are different questions which may lead to different outlooks. What is the final goal of the EU? Shall it be a regional organization, along with a United Africa or United Arabia, America or whatever different regions may find appropriate? In this case, a geographical definition may be helpful to determine a certain range of political tasks. And thus, Sarkozy’s initiative would finally turn out to be quite helpful.

Or is “Europe” a universal idea, some kind of eschatology? Is it aimed at uniting mankind, gradually replacing the United Nations? In this case, Sarkozy would have launched an attempt to torpedo the project.

Even if one choses the former approach, like I prefer myself, some cautions are necessary.
First, the simple fact should not be lost that geography is not politics. It has some weight in politics, and not just in geopolitics, but it cannot and should not determine them. We cannot foresee once and forever wether the EU may one day be forced to expand beyond the borders of geographical Europe.
On the other hand, there are political and economic criteria of EU accession which cannot be abandoned without endangering the functions and tasks of EU policies. Thus, they should not be questioned with merely geographical or geopolitical arguments..
Third, those natural borders are not determinable by the meter and do not coincide with political borders by the meter. The illusion that political borders necessarily have to be adapted to geographical ones should be avoided.

In sum, these cautions may determine what might be a reasonable output of an expert commission on geographical borders. That is, there shouldn’t be much more than an orientation mark saying that EU institutions “recognize”, “will take into consideration” and “consider” a document which puts together the conclusions of the commission, and “will work to facilitate political coherence in geographical Europe”. Though peace and collaboration “in Europe” requires all of this Europe to take part one way or another, more of a self-commitment of the EU might be counterproductive. Accession still remains a political process, and anyway, request of reasonable collaboration and stable relations surpasses the borders of any political union or geographical entity.

Final remark

Finally, there is an ominous coincidence which links myself to the French president. I was born on the 6^th of December, the day which the liturgical calendar marks for St. Nicholas of Patara or of Myra. The first name links the saint to the place of his birth, the second to the seat of his bishopric, both small harbour towns in southwestern Anatolia, Turkey. Perhaps, St. Nicholas may guide the president Nicholas Sarkozy to better understand these and other places. The prospective commission might indeed pave the way from misleading school curricula to the geopolitical duties of a French president, and that alone might be reason enough.

The end