There are times when to observe Turkish politics may be tiresome and frustrating, particularly if you feel some sympathy for the Turks (in a broad meaning), the main victims of these politics. As an observer, you can’t do much about it. So sometimes it may be better to leave for a stroll in the greenery.
V. Geopolitical implications?
Quite recently, an Italian friend reassured me that Italian geographical feeling tends to see the Caucasus as a border of Europe, which meets a traditional German assumption. A certain difference however should not be overlooked: The Italian view is setting a northeastern border here, so that “Europe” is south and “Asia” is north of the Caucasus, whereas the German tradition has “Europe” to the north and “Asia” to the south. There seem to be no tangible reasons why either of these options should be considered to be the correct one; obviously, it has more to do with the question on which side of the Alps we find “us” and “them”. Or wether we fought our biggest wars against, or had most important trade relations with the Russians or the Turks/Byzantines? In either case we deal with causes rather than reason(s), and should investigate the collective subconscious rather than vegetation.
Perhaps it is for this reason why I had to learn in school that the border is not the Caucasus, but the Manych Swamps (a left tributary of the River Don immediately east-northeast of the Asow Sea). According to that faction of German geography (I don’t remember who’s the original source), these swamps and the adjacent North-Caspian desert were a more important barrier between peoples than the Caucasus. Some historical investigation will reveal that this observation, however relative, is more correct than not.
It remains inconsistent however, because neither the Bosphorus and Hellespont nor the Ural River or mountains ever separated peoples, and nonetheless they shall be parts of the same borderline which here is established on the separation of peoples. The steep High Caucasus is not effective enough as a border, whereas the rather hilly Ural shall do? I would call this confusion rather than reason or education. And just like my teacher couldn’t answer my questions then, I’m convinced that no geographer can successfully defend this nonsense.
Whatsoever, it may be interesting that German correspondents dubbed the city of Baku (Azerbaijan) on TV “a fairly Mediterranean city” or “clearly the most European city in the whole Caucasus region” (meaning inclusive of the Russian provinces). That may be counted in favor of the Italian point of view. So we may not have a border of Europe there, but if there is any, then Europe is in the South.
It should be obvious that Europe is not simply an issue of plant geography (and all the less that of the more vagile fauna, perhaps except the soil invertebrates), although it neither is fully independent of this. In the deserts or semi-deserts of the Caspian plains and the Iranian highlands, the continuity of rather evenly spaced settlements from the Atlantic eastwards comes to an end. At least in terms of vegetation, which is an alternative indicator for that condition, there is however no clearcut borderline. There is a bit of “vegetative Europe” in parts of northwestern Iran, and some of “vegetative Orient” (northern variant) in Caucasia. Same with southern (west-Caspian) Russia. But here, it is correct to say that further to the north Eastern Europe extends even to Western Siberia.
VI. Geopolitical politics.
Indeed, flora and vegetation (etc.) may give us a hint as to where we are ecologically and geo-historically. Their immediate link to politics however remains in the field of biological conservation, agriculture and forestry, and environmental issues, which in principle do not stop at any border whatsoever. But they indicate where, approximately, we should stop to use the term “Europe”. Insofar there are implications for a geopolitical entity which has minced (sic) the term “European Union” for itself.
As to the second leg, that is “Union”, some other criteria must be applied. And these are certainly not exhausted with the details of “Copenhagen” and “Maastricht”.
Since quite some years, we discuss how far this Union may extend in the (near) future, or wether we should discuss it at all. It is a foregone conclusion that discussions cannot be blocked once and forever, and that the suppressed issues of discussion will definitely come up again, and maybe at the worst moment possible.
For more than thirty years, the Union has not seen borders of any durability, and such borders are not to be expected for quite some time. On the other hand, this undermines the sense of belonging of those who are considered the citizens of the Union. As in such a mood the EU cannot be “us”, it becomes “them”. The Union becomes or remains something alien for its assumed citizens. Alien, but powerfully present in nearly every aspect of life. Thus, something to mistrust.
To create or restore an atmosphere of trust, several ways are possible. Mere advertisement – yes, it is a necessity as in every enterprise, but obviously insufficient by itself. Increased effectivity and efficiency, with respect to the economy and every field of European politics. More democratic participation. Subsidiarity. It is well known and is the substance of what is essentially a constitution of sorts, however we may call it.
But we also need a reliable idea of what is the physical EU, and what is the intention. Is it an unsatiable “Moloch” (which will die from obesity sooner or later)? In plain words, where are the prospective borders?
For that, the outline of a geographical Europe may be useful, although not sufficient. There are several “prerogatives” deriving from the “acquis communautaire”. First, “pacta sunt servanda”, the precondition of every civilization and all the more of every union of whichever type. Second, “every European country” may apply for membership. Third, then, the criteria of “Copenhagen” and “Maastricht” as well as the total of the “acquis” must be implemented. Forth, at this point the EU and its member countries provide some support, which however depends on specific negotiations. All this is already known and, while it is indeed logical and necessary, it proves to be still insufficient.
West of Russia and Iran, north of the Arab world
So in addition I propose an outline where expansion is expected to stop, at least in the foreseeable future. It requires criteria which are comprehensible enough on either side, easy enough to memorize for an average mind, while also considering the relevant interests of the Union as such.
The outline I propose is “west of Russia and Iran, north of the Arab world”. So far, the demands for memorability should be met. For the inquisitive mind an “east of America” might be added.
The reasons for that proposal are mainly political.
As to Russia, it is more European than not, but simply too big for a Union of small- to medium-sized states. It would inevitably dominate the Union by its sheer weight. And in a sense it is even the raison d’être for the European Union to balance Russia. So it’s the perfect constellation to consider something like a “privileged partnership” between the two.
As to Iran, it’s big but perhaps not too big. However, more than ninety percent fall by all standards outside geographical Europe. That may be reason enough to attempt close relations, but not membership.
As to the Arab world, some regions (esp. in the Levant and Morocco) have natural features quite similar to southern Europe, though that’s still rather peripheral for the Arab geopolitical entity as a whole. And indeed, it is a cultural and political entity, in some sense even a geo-ecological one. The region has not yet found its balances of unity and diversity, but people display both these aspects. This means that the accession of one Arab state to the EU would immediately create an irredenta. A “casus belli”, in the longer run. Even (and not least) if this state would be Israel, though it’s not an Arab country in the strict sense.
At any rate, thus, the accession of an Arab state in that sense would strictly contradict the goals of the EU, which is the main political reason to exclude this possibility. It may even be of secondary interest that the bigger part of the Arab entity is by all standards situated on another geomorphological continent, Africa. Again, this shall not exclude any reasonable cooperation.
VII. The other side of the coin.
The question may remain wether the EU should indeed fill this outline completely.
In part, this is answered by the first condition of the acquis, “pacta sunt servanda”, which at this point relates to Turkey in first line, but more losely also to the West-Balkan states.
The second condition, “every European state”, may appear more ambiguous. However, there is no reasonable way to define any state “west of Russia” (or west of the Caspian Sea) as non-European, so obviously each may apply for membership. It is indeed a very “natural” option with or without quotation marks. The rest belongs to the sphere of criteria for membership in detail. Another case is set by states who may or may not fulfill the criteria, but simply do not want to participate. In such a case, some other means of cooperation can be found, such like the European Economic Area and sectoral treaties in fields of mutual concern. But such a lose affiliation would also bear more vagility and more risks.
There may be practical-political reasons to postpone some steps, beyond the implications of the criteria mentioned above. In first line, such possible reasons relate to Russia. Russia not only has the spatial dimensions of an empire, but also behaves as such by interfering with the legitimate governments and by protecting armed separatisms (two in Georgia, one each in Moldavia and Azerbaijan), for instance. The aim is clearly not a support for separatism per se (which may serve as unwanted precedents for Russia’s internal problems), as they may well support the opposite camp (Serbia and Greek Cyprus) in case that’s the way they can get a foothold in the respective country. Most probably it is an expression of an imperial mindset to see neighboring states as a “glacis”, essentially a field where to take position for the next war.
One advisable reaction might be to make sure that Russia cannot get a foothold at the Dardanelles, as this would realize an age-old dream of Russian imperialism - no doubt, it would stimulate further adventures not favorable for Europe (nor for the Russians, to be sure). At the moment the best way may be to increase pre-accession cooperation with Turkey as far as possible. As a matter of course, Europe should not discuss wether or not they are willing to act in conformity with their contractual commitments. They should act to fulfill unilateral commitments as well (as regards Cyprus, for instance).
Another important consideration should be to not let the own intentions open for too long. Because, this may exactly be a cause undermining Russia’s sense of security, as it definitely does in every country east of the current EU, and notably also in the EU itself. Whereas, a clear announcement of final intentions may provide a long-term basis for political and economic planning and cooperation for everybody.
Quite naturally, such an announcement was not possible in the immediate wake of the Soviet downbreak, as this had come as a surprise for almost everybody, and suddenly a cacophony of immediate risks and tasks demanded to be managed. But now, some two decades later, a comprehensive outlook is overdue.
VIII. Individual cases.
It seems to be a frequently overlooked connection that to recognize borders is the way to deal with them in a productive manner. One might mention the way to the “Helsinki” process, for instance. Once the spatial dimensions are clear, the EU has three definite neighbors: Russia, Iran, and the Southern Mediterranean. Two of these borders are exceptionally long. One of these is basically a terrestrial border with some maritime sectors, in various but oftenly densely populated regions, which means that there will be an intense and complex border traffic. All the more so as the two stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts and are of crucial importance for each other in terms of economy, ecology and security. A giant task in itself, but it may be simplified exactly when we can reduce it to an issue of two sides instead of many. Which I think would be helpful for both.
In the Mediterranean, we may come out with a unified northern vis-à-vis a still diverse southern camp. The latter should be open for the whole Arab peninsula. Then the North may serve, to some degree, as a model for the South, in case and as far as this is wanted by the southern neighbors. Possible projects for cooperation in the Mediterranean and along the Turkish-Arab borders are manifold in either case.
Iran remains as a classical neighborhood of a medium-sized state, with rather well-known implications.
If we regard the European neighborhood in this way, as three units, we see that each is of prime importance in many respects, but for the time being most prominently as suppliers of energy. This is also an issue for the other side of the coin, which is the (supposedly final) EU enlargement.
IX. Arteries.
Only one of the prospective eastern EU candidates, Azerbaijan, is a net producer of hydrocarbons. But another five or six (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, Moldavia, and again Azerbaijan) are actual or possible transit countries. Of these, Turkey has a key position as it is connected with Russia (and Central Eurasia-CE), Azerbaijan (possibly CE), Iran (possibly CE), Iraq, and Syria (assumed to become a transit country soon).
For reasons which should be evaluated separately, only Armenia has opted out of this lucrative business, which is of vital importance for both the consumers and producers. It is not a reasonable option for the EU to follow the Armenian example, although some politicians seem to be ready to do so. But this is rather their way to display some insincerity, alias populism. Instead of following, the task for the EU is to convince Armenia to adopt more civilized methods of politics, which excludes the invasion and occupation of neighboring countries (or any other countries, for that). Meanwhile, we should not hesitate to support Armenia as regards conservation of endemic plant or animal species, as this is also an aspect of civilized behavior.
With the exception of Armenia (more implicitely) and Belarus (explicitely, but with an ambiguous basis in the population), each of the countries in question has declared to opt for EU membership as soon as possible. Naturally, the Union has to respect either option. In the case of the majority, steps are required to continue, to start, or to accelerate accession or pre-accession activities, depending on the individual case. For those opting out, alternative concepts of partnership may be evaluated.
Accession however is a very natural option not only from the viewpoint of plant geography. The position between two large blocks is less than comfortable in some respect, at least for a small or medium-sized country. For them, the EU as a cooperation of small and medium-sized countries (“SMCs”) is the only logical option, at least when the phase of obsessive nationalisms is left behind or avoided. For the very same reason, the factual options of Armenia and Belarus appear rather provisional and reversible, whereas the others are probably not.
In fact, we have already two regional coalitions. The first is composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldavia (GUAM), which despite some mutual investments and sectoral cooperations is rather an ideological alliance of post-Sovietic SMCs, some exchange for thoughts, shared feelings, and history; including their shared resistance to some post-Sovietic Russian interference. The second links Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. This one has very practical purposes, although there is much rhetoric of historical brotherhood - which in some sense indeed exists, but not without ambiguities. It’s a matter of choices wether you prefer the closely related language over the historical Sunni-Shii hostilities in the case of Turkey-Azerbaijan, or to which aspects of the millenium-long history of Turkish-Georgian relations you pay most of your attention or, at least, dedicate your rhetorics. And those choices are not to be found in history itself, which serves as some sort of an arsenal or fund of equipment.
As everybody knows, large parts of the two Caucasian republics are under occupation, both have suffered a post-Soviet downbreak of their economies, both are toiling over rotten Soviet infrastructures, and both need reliable neighbors which may provide stability and economic opportunities. The region is rather short of this sort, but luckily there was Turkey. Most luckily, a Turkey in full economic upswing, a market economy, and a cornerstone of NATO.
Best known are the oil and gas pipelines from A. through G. to T. and the world markets, but there is another, (post-) Sovietic one, linking Georgia to Azerbaijan. A railway linking the small Caucasian net to Turkey is under construction. The markets are open, and when Russia closed itself for Georgia, Turkey even became the biggest foreign customer for Georgian wine, a key product of Georgian agriculture. Mutual investments are still rather modest, but considerable for the smaller partners and partly of strategic importance (esp. airports in Georgia, banking in Azerbaijan). Moreover, Turkey assists both countries to approach NATO military standards. The story continues in the “usual sectors” of neighborhood policies, like student and cultural exchange, tourism, occasional humanitarian assistance, and indeed in nature conservation. The Turkish Black Sea-highway has become a vital outlet for Georgia, while Azerbaijan is planning to build an oil refinery in Turkey.
The interests of the European Union to include the region are vital and obvious. Issues like access to energy sources, military presence, the overall arrangement of European neighborhood, safeguarding cultural and religious pluralism, economic growth and volume of internal markets, various natural resources, and finally long-term internal balances of Europe all require the same. In such a case, to avoid the problems involved is not an option.
The end
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