Secret understanding between the AKP and EU

The statement by Ollie Rehn, implying that the closure case filed against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) might lead to the suspension of entry talks has no doubt made the officials of the party quite happy.

It seems however that it sent shockwaves through not only those in Turkey who believe that injustice is being done to the AKP, but also to some in Europe.

“The correlation between the case and the entry talks was first invoked by Foreign Minister [Ali] Babacan,” said an EU diplomat, when I asked about Rehn’s statement.

It appears that whenever there is a crisis looming over the head of the AKP, Babacan spends hours on the phone with Olli Rehn. And since the tradition of keeping a track record of the tete a tete meetings has vanished during the AKP’s rule, we are clueless on the substance of these long “chats.”

From what I gather, Babacan held another tete a tete with Rehn on the margins of the unofficial meeting of the EU ministers, last weekend in Slovenia. After the meeting Rehn informed his advisors that he will make a statement invoking the relation with the accession process. And despite objections from his advisors not to do so, he did go ahead and made the statement at a time when the Constitutional Court was on the verge of deciding wether to accept the indictment, which created the perception that the EU is warning the court members on the consequences if they decide to accept the case. “This is meddling with the judiciary,” said a high-level Turkish official. “This can only be explained in one way; the EU and the AKP reached an agreement,” said another official.

Most of the Turkish bureaucrats dealing with EU affairs are of the view that Europe wants Turkey to be content with the opening of one or two chapters, during each presidency, so that entry talks can drag on for at least four to five years. “They tell the AKP not to press for a faster pace on negotiations. In reverse, they will support the AKP.” This is the so-called secret understanding between the EU and the AKP.

There might be validity to this speculation. Yet, we all know that the EU is not a monolith and those who believe that a slower pace of negotiations will mean a slower pace of reforms, have been annoyed by Rehn’s statement. Therefore, it is a weak possibility for Barroso, the head of the Commission to repeat Rehn’s statement when he will come to Ankara next week. Obviously, it’s difficult to predict the exact outcome of the (yet again) tete a tete meeting between Prime Minister Erdoğan, Barroso, and Rehn. (According to preliminary arrangements, only Erdoğan’s translator will be present during the talks.)

What is certain however is that Barroso will call for more reforms. And this time, he will find a more enthusiastic audience as far as the government is concerned. Because, Babacan (some of us might have forgotten, but he is the main negotiator) decided some time ago to focus on EU issues. Maybe he is a good fortuneteller. He probably foresaw the troubles ahead and quickly realized that the AKP might be in need to embrace the EU one more time; since on March 8, that is before the file was opened, he decided to leave aside the “program for the adoption of the acquis,” and instructed the preparation of the national program. The difference between the two is that the national program is binding, in the sense that a time table is given to the European Commission for all the changes that will be made to adopt the Turkish laws and regulations to those of the EU. Since the AKP government did not want to commit itself, it had avoided preparing the national program. However, only 10 percent progress is made on the program for the adoption of the acquis, in the course of one year. Although Babacan is responsible for this situation, he decided to scrap the program and go ahead with the national program, which will be more binding.
“We started to see more of Babacan,” said a Turkish bureaucrat. Well, as long as this case continues, Babacan will be a regular visitor of the EU.